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Abstract Recently it has been hypothesized that climate change will affect total factor
productivity growth. Given the importance of TFP for long-run economic growth, if true this
would entail a substantial upward revision of current impact estimates. Using macro TFP
data from a recently developed dataset in the Penn World Table, we test this hypothesis by
directly examining the nature of the relationship between annual temperature shocks and TFP
growth rates in the period 1960–2006. The results show a negative relationship only exists in
poor countries, where a 1 °C annual increase in temperature decreases TFP growth rates by
about 1.1–1.8 percentage points, whereas the impact is indistinguishable from zero in rich
countries. Extrapolating fromweather to climate, the possibility of dynamic effects of climate
change in poor countries increases concerns over the distributional issues of future impacts
and, from a policy perspective, restates the case for complementarity between climate policy
and poverty reduction.
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1 Introduction
Since the path-breaking work of Nordhaus (1991), economists have argued in favour of a
modest carbon tax. A Pigou tax is justified if it is more likely than not that climate change has
a net negative impact on present welfare. Although frequently challenged in favour of more
stringent climate policy, estimates of the social cost of carbon have not increased over the
years (Tol 2018). Three independent author teams (Moore and Diaz 2015; Dietz and Stern
2015; Moyer et al. 2014) have recently hypothesized that, should climate change negatively
affect total factor productivity, then the estimate of the Pigou tax increases drastically. In this
paper, we present econometric evidence of the impact of weather and climate on total factor
productivity growth. While not disputing the sign of the hypothesized effect, we show the
average effect size is small.
Most impact studies of climate change have taken the form of comparative statics impact
estimates. These studies show that climate change would have a modest negative impact of
human welfare, i.e., a few percent over a century (Tol 2018), but they have been criticized
because they could not fully capture the potential damage by future climate change (Pindyck
2012, 2013; Stern 2013; Weitzman 2009, 2011).
Besides static impacts on welfare, there are also dynamic ones: climate change affects
the growth rate of the economy (Fankhauser and Tol 2005; Hallegatte 2005). The distinction
between static, or “level” effects, and dynamic, or “growth” effects of climate change on
economic activity is of first order importance in terms of the magnitude of future impacts.
While the so-called level effects are temporary and intrinsically reversible, growth effects
compound over time and permanently reduce output. An impact of hot temperatures on a
given year’s agricultural yields would represent a level effect, while an impact on investments
or institutions would affect the economy’s ability to grow, altering its future path. Fankhauser
and Tol (2005) argue that climate change may affect labour supply, capital depreciation and
productivity (rather than productivity growth). They find that, if these effects are negative,
economic growth would be suppressed. The resulting welfare loss would be similar in size
to the estimates of the static welfare losses.
Since the onset of growth economics and the pioneering Solow model (Solow 1956)
TFP has been considered a key element to explain long-run development. TFP, as is widely
known, represents a combination of labour and capital productivity, which accounts for
increase in total output not due to labour or capital inputs, and traditionally has been seen as
a rough measure of technological progress. Recently, a number of theoretical studies have
hypothesized a future impact of global warming on TFP growth (Stern 2013; Moore and
Diaz 2015; Dietz and Stern 2015; Moyer et al. 2014). Given the preeminent importance of
TFP for long-run economic growth, if climate change will really harm TFP growth rates, this
would entail a radical revision of impact estimates.
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Dietz and Stern (2015) change the workings of DICE, one of the most used Integrated
Assessment Models (IAMs), to allow climate impacts to affect TFP growth.1 They find a
much stronger case for stringent emission abatement.
Similarly, Moyer et al. (2014) argue that the IAMs used by the US federal Interagency
Working Group (IWG)2 on the Social Cost of Carbon may not capture the full range of
consequences of climate change, and contest the fact that “(IAMs) implicitly assume that
society will grow far wealthier in the future even if temperatures increase by amounts that
many scientists believe may cause substantial hardships”. Consequently they change DICE
and allow climate impacts to directly affect TFP growth, finding, consistently with Dietz and
Stern (2015) large effects on future growth and a much higher value of the Social Cost of
Carbon (SCC) than the IWG one.3
However, these works do not provide any empirical evidence for this claim and the con-
sequent simulations (Tol 2018). In fact, while these calibrated models are very sensitive to
assumptions about the impact of climate change on TFP growth, the assumptions are just
that: they are not grounded in observations. The current paper estimates the impact of weather
variability and climate change on total factor productivity growth.
There is a large and growing body of empirical literature which focuses on the relationship
between climate and economic activity. Jared Diamond (Diamond 1999) revived the spirit
of Ellsworth Huntington (Huntington 1922), arguing that geography and climate are the
fundamental drivers of economic development. Olsson and Hibbs (2005) provide empirical
support. Gallup et al. (1999) argue that geography and climate are important, but that their
impact can be modified by technology. In sharp contrast to this environmental determinism,
(Acemoglu et al. 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004) argue for institutional
determinism and find that, in a direct statistical contest, institutional variables have predictive
power but climate and geography variables do not. The institutional view has been challenged
by Alsan (2014) and Andersen et al. (2016). Alsan (2014) shows that the tse–tse fly is a major
factor in the underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Andersen et al. (2016) show that UV
radiation (but not climate) plays a role in explaining the pattern of development across the
world.
These cross-section analyses of the climate-income relationship suffer from a range of
endogeneity and confounders problems. A literature has emerged that uses robust panel
studies that try to isolate the effect of temperature or other meteorological variables on
economic activity and growth.4 A comprehensive review is carried out in Dell et al. (2014).
As far as climate change is concerned, though, this literature is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, as emphasized by Tol (2018), weather impacts are assumed to be informative
about climate impacts; put differently, short-term elasticities are used to assess long-term
effects. Second, since the Industrial Revolution global temperature has risen of almost 1 °C
(IPCC 2013) while increases in temperature during the 21st centurywill very likely be of 2 °C
or more (IPCC 2013) whichmeans these studies extrapolate far beyond historical experience.
Third, it is by no means guaranteed that historical relationships will continue to hold in the
future as technologies and institutions evolve. However, while external validity is debatable,
1 Further changes to the DICE framework they undertake are allowing for convexity of the damage function
(Weitzman 2010) and for high values of the climate sensitivity parameter (Weitzman 2009, 2011).
2 DICE (Nordhaus 2008), FUND (Anthoff et al. 2009) and PAGE (Hope 2006).
3 Also, they notice how impacts on growth would contribute to settle the debate on the discount rate sparked
after the publication of the Stern Review (Stern et al. 2006). See also Nordhaus (2007), Stern (2013) and Tol
et al. (2006).
4 As they explain: “panel data exploit the exogeneity of cross-time weather variation, allowing for causative
identification”.
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there are techniques, as for example long differences, that can alleviate these concerns. Thus,
these caveats notwithstanding, recently panel methods have been employed to disentangle
level effects from growth effects.
For example, in a global sample from 1950 to 2003, Dell et al. (2012) find temperature
shocks have significant negative effects onGDPgrowth of poor countries, but not of rich ones.
Interestingly, using weather lags and long differences, they find evidence for persistence of
impacts, which suggests temperature shocks are only slowly absorbed by the economy and
have long-lasting effects in poor countries, leading them to conclude that temperature also
affects the growth rate of GDP in poor countries, other, or rather, than output level. Bansal and
Ochoa (2011) do not exploit country-specific temperature shocks, but global average temper-
ature shocks, and find tropical countries are the most vulnerable and that on average a 1 °C
global increase reduces growth by 0.9%. A study on windstorms by Hsiang and Jina (2014)
for 28 Caribbean countries over the 1970–2006 period shows similar results. Burke et al.
(2015), studying 166 countries between 1960 and 2010, find that productivity peaks at about
13 °C and declines non-linearly thereafter, without significant heterogeneity between rich
and poor countries, leading them to predict impacts much larger than previously estimated.
More recently, Using detailed micro-data on Chinese firm production, Zhang et al. (2018)
document an inverted-U shape relationship between temperature and TFP at the firm level.
These studies focus on the recent past, which saw only limited climate change. This could,
on the one hand, lead one to speculate that these impacts could be exacerbated by further
increases or non-linear effects which lie outside historical experience and, on the other, that
weather impacts must be interpreted with caution given both the difference between a 1 °C
shock in a given year and place and a permanent 1 °C global increase, and the fact that
in the long-run adaptation may take place and substantially mitigate negative impacts. It is
the controversial but ultimately difficult to solve “intensification vs adaptation” debate over
which of these two long-term effects will eventually outweigh the other (Dell et al. 2014).
A first consequence of this new wave of empirical studies on climate and growth has been
to induce practitioners to use these new estimates to derive empirically-based projections and
implement them in IAMs to see how these respond to the relaxation of assumptions about
exogenous economic growth.
Moore and Diaz (2015) show that if DICE is modified and calibrated on Dell et al. (2012),
the predicted impacts go up, and so the consequent SCC, compared to the baseline scenario in
which climate change does not affect growth. Lemoine and Kapnick (2015) convert estimates
of past economic costs of regional warming into projections of the economic costs of future
global warming. They do recognize, though, that this is mostly relevant only for relatively
small changes in climate.
Using TFP data from the most recent version of the Penn World Table, we use a panel
dataset for 60 countries, covering the period 1960–2006, to test the hypothesis of a causal
relationship between temperature shocks and annual TFP growth rates. What emerges from
our analysis is that temperature shocks affect annual TFP growth rates only in poor countries.
This conclusion is subjected to caveats and must be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless,
it basically confirms the results of Dell et al. (2012) and rejects the conclusions of Burke
et al. (2015). We also show that the assumptions of Dietz and Stern (2015), Moore and Diaz
(2015) and Moyer et al. (2014) have no empirical grounding.
The contributions of this paper are the following: first, it provides a useful empirical test
for the plausibility of the recent hypothesis of an impact of climate change on TFP growth.
Second, to our knowledge this is the first study to examine the macro relationship between
temperature shocks and TFP growth. Third, unlike other previous works on temperature and
economic growth, this analysis can provide direct, and not just indirect, evidence on the
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persistence of weather impacts on economic activity in the medium or long-run, since it
focuses on TFP, and not GDP, growth rate.
Fourth, we show the main reason behind the impact on TFP growth in poor countries is
labour productivity, thus linking the existing macro literature with the recent micro studies
on the relationship between temperature and human physiology.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical
background on the potential TFP-climate change relationship. Section 3 presents data and
descriptive statistics. Section 4 describes the identification strategy. Section 5 presents empir-
ical results. Section 6 investigates the potential explanations for the heterogeneity of impacts
detected in Sect. 5. Section 7 discusses the implications of the results with regard to climate
change. Section 8 sums up, illustrates some caveats and concludes.
2 Background on the TFP Impact Channel
We follow Dietz and Stern (2015) to show how climate change could affect technological
progress.
Consider the standard DICE model: a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth model with an
added climate externality and emission abatement costs:
Yt  (1 − ΩYt )(1 − Λt )[AtN1−αt Kαt ] (1)
where At and Nt are specified exogenously, Kt evolves according to the standard equation:
Kt+1  Kt (1 − δ) + sYt (2)
V
t are emission abatement costs and ΩYt is a quadratic damage function of the change in
global temperature relative to the global mean in 19005:




Equation (1) represents the impact function in case of only level effects: in this model, a
portion of output in each time period is simply “thrown away” due to the impacts of climate
change ΩYt .
In this framework, climate impacts affect long-run economic growth as climate change
reduces current output, and hence savings and investment, which in turn reduce future capital
and future output. The savings rate may also be affected, as the returns to investment fall.
Both effects have been shown to be quantitatively small (Fankhauser and Tol 2005; Moyer
et al. 2014).
If, instead, climate change also affects TFP, things change substantially. Specifically, TFP
is endogenous and grows according to the following law of motion:
At+1  (1−ΩAt ) (1 − δAt ) At + α (It ) (4)
where δAt is the net depreciation rate for productivity, α(It) is a “spillover function” that
converts the flow of capital investment in each period into a flow of capital externalities, and
ΩAt are the impacts of climate change on TFP, while the remaining share of damages still
affects output level.
5 The damage function is usually calibrated ad hoc on the basis of impact studies of climate change. The
quadratic form has been criticized because it does not allow for a steep increase of damages at higher temper-
atures (Stern 2013; Weitzman 2010).
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Damages are then partitioned between output and TFP:
ΩAt  fA · Ωt (5)
ΩYt  1 −
(1 − Ωt )(
1 − ΩAt
) (6)
where fA is the fraction of impacts of climate change that harms TFP growth.
The effects of this modification depend on the share of impacts directly affecting TFP, but
even a small share leads to a radically different consumption growth path: Dietz and Stern
(2015) assume that fA 0.05 and find that consumption per capita in year 2205 is reduced
from more than 15 times the 2005 level to 11.4 times higher. Moyer et al. (2014) explore
the consequences of different values of fA between 1 and 100%. They show that fA 0.05
leads to a 70% drop in consumption per capita in 2300 relative to the no climate change
case. Similar qualitative results are obtained by Moore and Diaz (2015) when they alter the
DICE model to let climate change affect TFP growth on the basis of parameters calibrated
on the estimates of Dell et al. (2012). As Dietz and Stern (2015) sum up: “in this formulation
some part of the instantaneous impacts of climate change falls on TFP, permanently reducing
future output possibilities”.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
Data for this paper are taken from a range of different sources.
3.1.1 TFP Data
Data on total factor productivity of countries come from the most recent version of the Penn
World Table, PWT 8.1 (PWT 8.1 2016). In particular, in our study we use RTFPNA data,6
where RFTPNA stands for “Real Total Factor Productivity from National Accounts data”.
RTFPNA is a country-specific index of TFPwhich, in the benchmark year, 2005, takes value 1
for all countries. RTFPNA can be used to study within-country productivity growth over time.
In our specifications, we use the natural logarithm of the RTFPNA index. This means that the
2005 benchmark value is 0 for all countries in the logarithmic specification. We calculate
annual RTFPNA growth rates by first-differencing, and check for stationarity.7 Henceforth,
from now on, “TFP growth rate” it is intended as the annual growth rate of the natural
logarithm of the RTFPNA index as taken from PWT 8.1.
These pre-estimated TFP growth data are calculated using the growth rate of real GDP
from national accounts data, in conjunction with the growth rates of capital stock at constant
national prices and of the labour force (Feenstra et al. 2013). This is a standard process in
TFP estimation as a residual of a combination of labour and capital. TFP obviously depends
on the estimate of the other components. As any measure of TFP, these PWT data are not
immune from concerns about measurement error; this issue will be addressed below. For
further information on the RTFPNA index and data, see Web Appendix (1).
6 Note that this series has only recently become available. Previous studies of the impact of climate change
on economic growth, reviewed above, therefore did not have access to these data.
7 For the panel unit root tests for annual TFP growth, temperature change and precipitation change, see Web
Appendix (2), Tables A.1–A.6.
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Fig. 1 TFP levels and average temperatures in 2006
3.1.2 Temperature and Precipitation Data
These data are taken from the Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precipitation: 1900–2006
Monthly Time Series (Matsuura and Willmott 2007), from the University of Delaware
(UDEL), as aggregated to the country-year level by (Dell et al. 2012), using population
weights, where the weights are constructed from 1990 population data at 30 arc second reso-
lution from the Global Rural Urban Mapping Project (Balk et al. 2004). Importantly, given
temperature levels are trend-stationary, in order to exclude potentially spurious results and
ensure stationary residuals in our regressions, we transform data by first-differencing and
check for stationarity. We do the same with precipitation data.
3.1.3 GDP Data
We use per capita GDP data to distinguish between impacts in rich and poor countries. These
data come from the Maddison Project (‘Maddison Project’ 2016).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
The main dataset is composed of 60 countries8 and covers the period 1960–2006. Figure 1 is
a scatterplot of TFP and temperature levels in 2006, and the linear prediction. As can be seen,
there is a negative correlation between the two. This correlation is not a causal relationship,
but could be due to confounding factors such as institutions. There is no reverse causality.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for themain variables. There is a huge variation
both in the annual growth rates of TFP, with an average of about 5% annual increase but a
minimum and a maximum that are respectively −56 and 27%, and in terms of temperature
changes as well, where the mean annual change in temperature is very small but the extremes
are between 2 and 3 °C. Finally, precipitation exhibits even greater variability.
8 The choice of the countries has been made on the basis of data availability. For the list of countries, see Web
Appendix (4).
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean Var SD Min Max Obs
TFP growth
rate
0.481 15.485 3.935 −56.055 26.759 2760
Temp 0.012 0.318 0.564 −2.952 2.442 2760
Pre −0.014 5.942 2.438 −35.398 37.640 2760
GDP_percap 8.480 1.022 1.011 6.084 10.353 2820
TFP growth rate is the annual percentage change and expressed in natural logarithm
Temperature change is annual and expressed in °C
Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of 100 mm per year
GDP per capita is in natural logarithm of 1990 international Geary–Khamis dollars
4 Empirical Strategy
We use a fixed-effect panel as the estimation method to isolate the impact of weather shocks
on the growth rate of total factor productivity.9 Our identification strategy is straightforward
and follows Dell et al. (2012). The baseline specification of our model is the following:
T FPit  α + βT empit + γPreit + μi + θr t + εi t (7)
Where T FPit represents the annual growth rate of TFP, and T empit is annual temperature
change. Preit represents annual change in precipitation levels, which is used only as a
control variable following the recommendation in Auffhammer et al. (2013). By excluding
precipitation, we would run the risk of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, in order to investi-
gate for heterogeneous effects of temperature shocks, we followDell et al. (2014) and interact
the vector of temperature changes with dummies that capture the heterogeneity of interest,
in particular dummies for being a “poor” or a “hot” country.
One may be worried that rainfall is the only observed control variable in our specification.
However, since many traditional control variables are themselves affected by climate, adding
more time-varying observables which are endogenous to the weather variation could actually
be counterproductive and partially offset part of the true weather effect. This is the so-called
over-controlling problem (Dell et al. 2014) or ‘bad control’ (Burke et al. 2015), a well-known
issue in climate literature, which calls for caution and recommends to include only plausibly
exogenous covariates.
As for the other elements in the equation, μi are country fixed effects, θr t are region×
time fixed effects, where this interaction allows for differentiated trends in different regions,
as suggested by Dell et al. (2014), in order to isolate idiosyncratic local shocks.10 Finally, εi t
are error terms adjusted for clustering at the country level.
Reverse causality is a minor worry. Confounding variables, instead, could be a cause of
concern. TFP is constructed rather than observed. If weather variations would cause mismea-
surement in the size of the labour force or the capital stock, then we would wrongly attribute
this to TFP. For instance, weather variations could lead to short-term reallocation of workers
across industries or sectors, or short-term unemployment, that could be imperfectly mea-
sured by annual data on the labour force. The measurement problem is more likely to occur
9 For the appropriateness of the FE approach compared to a random effects (RE) specification, see Web
Appendix (2), Table A.7.
10 For the list of regions, see Web Appendix (5).
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in low-income countries. As temperature shocks impact TFP only in low-income countries,
this possible measurement problem would not be innocuous.11 However, we are not aware
of a way to test this for our data.
TFP is total factor productivity. By construction, when measured at a national, annual
resolution, TFP is amix of awide range of factors. Changes inTFP can be due to technological
change, the standard but flawed interpretation. Changes in TFP can also be due to managerial
or behavioural change, changes in the structure of the economy or company entry and exit
within sectors, changes in regulation or taxation, changes in the provision of public goods,
changes in market power, or changes in international trade. The results below show that
temperature variations affect TFP growth, but our data do not allow us to precisely identify
the channel throughwhichTFP is affected. That said, our approach is a step forward compared
to previous studies which looked at economic growth, an even more convoluted measure.
5 Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the results for the baseline specification of Eq. (7). Column (1) only includes
annual changes in temperature and precipitation levels. A first inspection shows that the
coefficient for the annual change in temperatures, Temp, is negative and significant at the
5% level, suggesting that a 1 °C annual increase in temperature would lower TFP growth
rates of countries by 0.49%. Column (2), however, reveals that adding an interaction between
temperature change and a dummy for being poor—with “poor” being defined as having a
below median GDP per capita in the initial year of our panel, 196012—substantially changes
the picture: this interaction in fact is negative and strongly significant, while the coefficient
for temperature changes is now negative but statistically insignificant, which suggests the
negative effects of temperature on TFP growth rates are concentrated in poor countries.
This is confirmed by looking at the net impact of temperature change in poor countries,
at the bottom of Column (2), which suggests a 1 °C annual increase in temperature in poor
countrieswould decrease TFPgrowth rates by about 1.5 percentage points, with a significance
at the 1% level.
This finding is somewhat weakened when we add an interaction between temperature
changes and a dummy for being hot, with “hot” being defined as having an above median
average temperature in the 1960s. The results are shown in Column (3): the coefficient of the
Poor×Temp interaction is now −1.2%, and significant at 5%, while the “hot” interaction
turns out to be insignificant, and so its net effect. Importantly, the total effect of temperature
in poor countries is also diminished both in terms of magnitude and significance.13 The fact
that the negative effect of temperature changes in poor countries is somewhat weakened
could be explained in two different ways: the first is that the negative effect of temperature
on TFP growth rates comes not only through being poor, but also, partially, through being
hot, and the second is that the definitions of “hot” and “poor” overlap to a good extent and
thus the inclusion of an “hot” interaction partially offsets the results for poor countries. The
distinction matters a great deal when it comes to conclusions with regard to future climate
change: it is a completely different picture whether the negative effects of temperature shocks
11 See, e.g., Colmer (2017) on the link between weather changes and labour reallocation across sectors.
12 The cut-off point for GDP per capita is approximately 2684.33 international Geary–Khamis dollars (1990
benchmark year).
13 Incidentally, it is also worth remarking how precipitation change has a negative and significant effect, but
this control variable has proved to be very sensitive to specifications throughout the entire empirical analysis
and its results should therefore be interpreted with caution and are no further discussed here.
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N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760
R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218
Adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.129 0.131 0.130 0.131

























All specifications include country FE and Region×Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries
with below median GDP per capita in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median
average temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per
capita. Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with average temperature in the 1960s above the 75%.
Temperature change is annual and expressed in °C. Precipitation change is annual and expressed in units of
100 mm per year
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
appear only in poor countries or also, even if slightly, in hot countries regardless whether
rich or poor.
In order to shed light on the issue, in Column (4) we use an alternative definition of poor,
with “poor” being now defined as having a below median GDP per capita, where median
GDP per capita is now calculated over the whole 1960—2006 period and not just in 1960 as
above.14 The “poor” interaction is again strongly significant, with the coefficient of Poor_2×
Temp again very similar, with a value of −1.43 percentage points, the “hot” interaction
again negative but statistically insignificant (and so its net total impact), and the total impact
in poor countries again significant at the 1% level. Therefore, this variation suggests that only
TFP growth rates of poor countries are affected by temperature shocks.
14 In this case the cut-off point for GDP per capita is approximately 4417.1 international Geary–Khamis
dollars (1990 benchmark year).
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Finally, to enhance confidence in this finding, in Column (5) and (6)we consider a different
definition of “hot” country, with the dummy for hot that has value 1 for countries with an
average temperature in the 1960s above the 75%percentile, and repeat our specifications. The
results, while confirming the negative impact of temperature shocks on the TFP growth rate
of poor countries, also show that there is a negative and 5% significant impact of temperature
shocks in hot countries, with a net effect of about −1 percentage point on the annual TFP
growth. In other words, even though the negative effect of annual temperature comes through
being poor, there also seems to be weak evidence of an impact in hot countries.
Given the importance of this distinction in terms of policy guidelines on climate change,
we conduct a variety of sensitivity tests to ensure the robustness of our results. In particular,
the following robustness checks are performed: the repetition of the baseline specification
for a different dataset, comprising 68 countries and covering the period 1970–2006; a spec-
ification including an interaction between temperature shocks and a dummy for being rich;
an investigation of the poor subsample of our dataset; a specification using a joint interaction
term for countries which are both poor and hot; a different classification between poor and
rich countries; regressions on changes in the number of persons employed and capital stock;
the use of Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors in place of clustered standard errors for
the baseline analysis in both samples; an investigation of persistence of temperature effects
through the inclusion of lags in the regressions; five different sensitivity tests to check for
robustness with respect to climatic data and functional forms of the weather variables. These
robustness checks are presented and discussed in the online appendix.15 Our key finding, i.e.
the pattern of heterogeneity of impacts between rich and poor countries, is never contradicted.
6 Heterogeneity in the Impacts of Temperature Shocks
Having established robustness of our results, we now move to a more in-depth analysis of
the heterogeneity of impacts.
Such heterogeneous pattern could be due to intrinsic differences, between rich and poor
countries, in climate, levels of development, quality of institutions and composition of TFP.
Below we discuss and test for each of these factors.
6.1 Differences in Climate and Non-linearity of Temperature Impacts
One might object that the reason for the heterogeneity in the impacts of temperature shocks
between is that we fail to account for non-linearity of temperature effects, i.e. the exoge-
nous difference in climatic conditions between rich and poor countries. Indeed, this is what
Burke et al. (2015) results suggest: “with most poor countries on the downward slope of the
response function [between the temperature level and the GDP growth rate] but rich countries
distributed almost symmetrically around the optimum, a linear regression for the effect of
temperature would recover a steep negative in poor countries but ambiguous (and closer to
zero) slope for rich countries”.16
To take this relevant possibility into account, we perform two separate tests. In Table 3
we present a different specification in which we include the square of annual temperature
change as an additional independent variable in the regressions, and we also interact it
with the “poor” and “hot” dummies like we do for annual temperature change in the main
15 See Web Appendix (3).
16 Supplementary Information, page 20.
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specification. As Columns (1)–(6) show, the square of annual temperature change is almost
always insignificant, even in poor countries. The total weather impacts are slightly bigger.
In Table 4 we opt for a different specification to capture potential non-linearity. First, we
follow the test recommended by Bigano et al. (2006) and Burke et al. (2015): in Column (1)
we include only an interaction between annual temperature change and average temperature.
Temp has a positive and strongly significant impact but the interaction with average tem-
perature is negative and strongly significant. This suggests that the impact of hot weather is
positive in cool countries and negative in warm countries. However, when we also include
an interaction between temperature change and average GDP per capita in Column (2), the
picture is different: now temperature shocks have a negative and significant impact, while
the interaction with GDP per capita is positive and significant. While the interaction with
average temperature is still negative and significant (although almost halved in magnitude),
the sign change of the coefficient of temperature shocks reveals that the temperature response
is being driven by average income, rather than by average temperature. The significant, neg-
ative interaction with average temperature suggests that hotter countries suffer from bigger
impacts, but because of the high correlation between heat and wealth it is difficult to separate
the two effects.
Finally, in Columns (3) and (4) we explore in further detail the possibility of differential
responses due to heat and affluence. In Column (3) we interact temperature shocks with dum-
mies capturing average temperature quartiles, i.e. we group countries in 4 categories: cold,
mild, warm and hot. This specification with temperature bins is relatively non-parametric
and can further shed light on potential non-linearity. The results in Column (3) confirm the
presence of non-linear dynamics: the impact of temperature shocks is positive and significant
for cold countries and negative and significant for mild, warm and hot countries.
However, when we add the respective interactions with average GDP per capita (Column
(4)), the signs of the coefficients for temperature shocks are negative for all the groups, and
significant only for mild and hot countries, whereas the interaction with average GDP per
capita is always positive, and weakly significant for mild and hot countries. The qualitative
insight is that there is no differential response due to heat, and that the relationship between
TFP growth and temperature shocks is mediated by income.
On the whole, these tests suggest that there is no evidence of meaningful non-linear
effects of temperature shocks, and that a linear function is the best approximation of the
TFP-temperature relationship for this dataset, in line with Dell et al. (2012). We also confirm
their finding that countries at different levels of development respond differently to weather
shocks. Therefore, heterogenous climates in rich and poor countries do not account for the
heterogenous impacts.
6.2 Differences in Development and/or Institutions
Are poor countries vulnerable to temperature shocks because of the existence of a develop-
ment and/or institutional gap compared to rich countries?
To answer this question, we investigate two specifications which could affect the inter-
pretation and validity of our findings. First, we run a specification in which we substitute the
“poor” interaction with an interaction between temperature shocks and GDP per capita. The
previous definitions of poor, in fact, are all based on a fixed classification between who is
rich and who is poor. This is fine for estimation, but not for simulation. In almost 50 years
countries that were poor in the beginning grew out of poverty, with the notable examples of
South Korea, Malaysia and China. We would hope for other countries to follow their lead
in the next 50 years. Interacting annual temperature changes with GDP per capita can over-
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N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760
R2 0.208 0.215 0.216 0.217 0.216 0.218
Adj. R2 0.121 0.128 0.128 0.130 0.129 0.130

























All specifications include country FE and Region×Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with
below median GDP per capita in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average
temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. Temperature change
is annual and expressed in °C. Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year.
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
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(1) (2) (4) (5)
Temp 0.884*** (0.177) −5.113** (2.464)
Avg. temp.×
Temp
−0.110*** (0.018) −0.059** (0.022)




Cold×Temp 0.028** (0.012) −0.198 (0.234)
Mild×Temp −0.060** (0.029) −0.614** (0.293)
Warm×Temp −0.062*** (0.022) −0.229 (0.210)








_cons 1.258*** (0.314) 1.248*** (0.322) 1.237*** (0.312) 1.236*** (0.331)
N 2760 2760 2760 2760
R2 0.215 0.217 0.216 0.218
Adj. R2 0.129 0.131 0.129 0.130
AIC 14723.915 14719.631 14723.828 14716.536
All specifications include country FE and Region×Time FE. Avg. Temp. is country average temperature.
Avg. GDP per capita is country average GDP per capita. Cold, Mild, Warm and Hot are dummies capturing
average temperature quartiles
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
come this, and provide evidence on whether the negative impact of temperature shocks on
the growth rate of TFP gets smaller or disappears as countries grow richer.
As Column (1) in Table 5 shows, this is the case. The interaction with GDP per capita is
positive and significant at the 1% level: solving the first derivative with respect to Temp,
and re-transforming the natural logarithm of GDP in dollars, suggests that the marginal effect
of a 1 °C annual increase becomes zero when income is approximately $34,400 per person
per year for countries classified as “hot”,17 approximately $14,900 per person per year for
countries not classified as “hot”,18 and approximately $25,600 per person per year for the
sample as a whole19 (see Figs. 2, 3 and 4 for a graphical representation of the marginal
effects, at different GDP per capita levels, for the three cases).
This indicates that, even though the estimates are inevitably imprecise, and the GDP level
where the marginal effect of Temp turns zero depends on the initial temperature level,
17 In natural logarithm: 10.447 (SE1.234).
18 In natural logarithm: 9.609 (SE0.351).
19 In natural logarithm: 10.150 (SE0.283).
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Table 5 Specifications with GDP per capita and Polity 2
Dependent variable: annual TFP
growth rate
(1) (2)
Temp −5.065** (1.921) −0.518 (0.318)
Pre −0.046** (0.022) −0.050** (0.022)
Poor×Temp −0.823** (0.328)
Polity 2×Temp 0.062* (0.032)




_cons 3.158 (6.143) 1.441*** (0.404)
N 2760 2705
R2 0.214 0.224
Adj. R2 0.127 0.136
AIC 14355.504 6698.196
Total effect in poor countries −1.342*** (0.336)
All specifications include country FE and Region×Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with
below median GDP per capita in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average
temperature in the 1960s. Temperature change is annual and expressed in °C. Precipitation change is annual
and expressed in units of 100 mm per year
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p < 0.01
Fig. 2 Marginal effect of Temp at different GDP per capita levels—hot1
development always means reduced vulnerability and, ultimately, immunity from the impact
of temperature shocks on TFP growth rate.
The second alternative specification includes an interaction between temperature changes
and a measure of institutional quality, Polity 2 (‘Polity IV Project’ 2014). We added this
interaction because it could be the case that negative impacts come not through being a poor
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Fig. 3 Marginal effect of Temp at different GDP per capita levels—hot0
Fig. 4 Marginal effect of Temp at different GDP per capita levels—whole sample
country, but through poor institutions, i.e. through low institutional quality. In the context of
the well-known debate on the determinants of long-run development (Acemoglu et al. 2001;
Diamond 1999; Easterly and Levine 2003; Gallup et al. 1999), the institution hypothesis is
one of the two main currents (the other being the geography hypothesis). Institutions are
considered by many (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Easterly and Levine 2003; Rodrik et al. 2004) as
the fundamental cause of economic growth in the long-run. This specification thus constitutes
a way of testing once again the relationship between climate, institutions and development.
We use Polity 2 as a measure of institutions. Polity 2 ranges from −10 to 10 and com-
bines the democracy and autocracy scores from the Polity IV dataset. In order to investigate
whether or not the impact of temperature appears also, or exclusively, through the institu-
tional channel, we interact it with annual temperature changes and add this interaction to the
baseline specification with the “poor” interaction.
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Column (2) in Table 5 shows our finding is not altered: the negative impact of temperature
still appears through being poor, and the coefficient for the total effect in poor countries
is analogous both in significance and magnitude to the previous ones. There is some weak
evidence that the interaction between temperature shocks and Polity 2 has a positive effect
on the TFP growth rate, but this is not enough to justify a rethinking of our main conclusion.
6.3 Differences in the Composition of TFP
We find a negative effect of weather shocks on total factor productivity growth, but only in
poor countries. Results from the previous section suggest the reason for this pattern is the
development, rather than institutional, gap between rich and poor countries. Such gap must
also entail heterogeneity in the composition of TFP which makes TFP growth vulnerable to
temperature shocks only in poor countries. This is probably due to the fact that poor countries
have a much larger share of their GDP in the agricultural sector, much more outdoor work
and lower adaptive capacity, which suggests that one of the channels could be an impact on
(outdoor) labour productivity.
Labour productivity is one of the components of total factor productivity. We use labour
productivity growth in place of TFP growth as an alternative dependent variable for two
reasons: first, it represents an additional and useful to check the robustness for our core
findings; and second, it could provide insights on the channels through which temperature
affects TFP growth and on the reasons why this is only the case for poor countries. Hence, we
repeat our basic specification, replacing annual TFP growth with annual labour productivity
growth, where labour productivity is defined as annual output per person employed. Data on
labour productivity have been obtained by Penn World Table, PWT 8.1 (PWT 8.1 2016), by
dividing real GDP at constant national prices by the annual number of persons employed.
Table 6 shows the results for the baseline sample:20 the impact of temperature shocks
on labour productivity growth is negative and significant only in poor countries, and the
coefficients are remarkably consistent and very similar inmagnitude and significance to those
of the TFP regressions, which suggests, as discussed in further detail in Sect. 7, that this is
indeed a key channel responsible for the temperature-TFP relationship in poor countries.
This has also been shown in studies of microdata (Cachon et al. 2012; Heal and Park 2015;
Niemelä et al. 2002; Sudarshan and Tewari 2013).
In sum, the pattern of heterogeneity in impacts is due to the differences in levels of devel-
opment—including institutional quality, access to markets, capital and technology, health
care and education—and in the composition of total factor productivity, which make poor
countries more vulnerable to temperature shocks compared to rich ones.
7 Implications of Climate Change
What do these results mean for future climate change? The temperature in poor countries in
the almost half century of our sample saw an increase of approximately 0.6 °C, or on average
0.012 °C per year. There were positive and negative shocks to the annual temperature but
the positive shocks were, on average, 0.012 °C larger. This means that, on average, negative
shocks to the annual TFP growth rate were 0.012 °C/year * 1.523 (cf. Table 2, Column (2))
0.018% (SE0.005%) per year larger than positive shocks.
20 Cf. Table A.24 in Web Appendix (3) for the alternative sample.
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N 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760 2760
R2 0.211 0.218 0.219 0.221 0.219 0.221
Adj. R2 0.125 0.132 0.133 0.135 0.133 0.135

























All specifications include country FE and Region×Time FE. Poor is a dummy with value 1 for countries with
below median GDP per capita in 1960. Hot is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average
temperature in the 1960s. Poor_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with below median GDP per capita.
Hot_2 is a dummy with value 1 for countries with above median average temperature. Temperature change is
annual and expressed in °C. Precipitation change is annual and expressed is in units of 100 mm per year
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. *p <0.10, **p <0.05, ***p <0.01
The 21st century could see an additional global warming of 0.3–4.8 °C21 (IPCC 2013). To
make projections on the impacts of future climate change,we incorporated in ourmain dataset
data on country-specific warming in the future period 2071–2095 compared to the reference
period 1980–2004. These data represent the average projected warming for Representative
Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5 (the business-as-usual scenario) for each country across
all global climate models included in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, Phase 5
(CMIP5), upon which the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report was based.22
21 Given that the standard deviation for annual temperature change is 0.56 °C (cf. Table 1), interannual
variability is quite large relative to the projected trend, so while this extrapolation should be interpreted with
the usual caution, its implications should not be a priori dismissed.
22 The data (for both temperature and precipitation change) were downloaded from: http://regclim.coas.oreg
onstate.edu/visualization/gccv/cmip5-global-climate-changeviewer/index.html.
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These projections were used in conjunction with the benchmark estimates from Column
(2) in Table 2 to predict the impact of future warming on TFP growth. Average warming by
the end of the century for countries in our sample is 3.912 °C, and there is no heterogeneity
in warming between rich and poor countries.
The results predict that, by the year 2095, climate change will entail a decrease of approx-
imately 3 percentage points in TFP growth, on average, compared to a scenario without
climate change. However, this aggregate prediction hides a sharp heterogeneity: TFP growth
in poor countries will suffer from a reduction of 5.96%, compared to a decrease of only 0.11%
in rich countries. If past relationships will continue to hold, and excluding both intensification
and adaptation, annual TFP growth rate in poor countries could be reduced by about 0.06%
per year. Over almost a 100 years, total factor productivity in poor countries would be 5.30%
below where it would be without climate change. This is an upper bound, as we estimated
the short-run semi-elasticity rather than the long-run one. This extrapolation is not immune
to concerns about external validity.
In the worst case scenario, annual TFP growth in poor countries would be lowered by
about 0.06% during this century. This is not trivial, considering that it would be an additional
dynamic effect to be added to the current impact estimates, but it is much smaller than
hypothesized and simulated in recent literature.
In the simulation using DICE 2010 run by Dietz and Stern (2015), and in particular in their
endogenous TFP model with standard assumptions about the damage function and climate
sensitivity, annual global TFP growth rate is reduced by about 0.20 percentage points, for
the period 2005–2205 and with a temperature increase of 5.7 °C above pre-industrial levels.
Using our estimates and their scenario,wefind a value of 1.523*(4.9/200)0.04%,23 roughly
five times lower and, importantly, only for poor countries.
Similarly, Moyer et al. (2014) alter the growth path of TFP in DICE, allowing for a
reduction in the annual global growth rate by more than 0.20%, over a 300-year period and
under a predicted temperature increase of 5.9 °C above pre-industrial. Under these conditions,
we would predict an annual decrease by 0.03%, but again only for poor countries.
In Moore and Diaz (2015), who endogenize TFP in a two-region (rich and poor) version
of DICE 2013R, using parameters calibrated on the empirical findings of Dell, Jones and
Olken (2012), the decrease in annual TFP growth rate in poor countries is approximately
0.52%, over the period 2015–2105, with a temperature increase over the century of about
3 °C. Conversely, our derived calculations for this simulation point to a reduction in the
annual growth rate of TFP in poor countries by about 0.05%, an order of magnitude lower
than their projection.
Unlike the papers above, we stress that once a certain income per capita threshold is
reached, these negative impacts would disappear altogether. Our estimates point to an upper
threshold of $34,400 income per capita (for hot countries), a value which, according to global
projections, will be largely surpassed during this century.
These results further increase concerns over distributional issues of future impacts. As
Tol (2018) shows, it is widely accepted that poor countries will be the ones who will suffer
the most from climate change impacts. This work confirms and reinforces this view, by
detecting dynamic effects from temperature shocks, and their persistence over time, only
in poor countries. Additionally, as explained in Inklaar and Timmer (2013), Keller (2004),
Griffith et al. (2004), TFP growth as a determinant of long-run economic growth is more
important in poor countries than in rich ones.
23 In the DICE model, temperature in 2005 is already 0.83 °C above pre-industrial.
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Finally, given that, as noted by Gillingham et al. (2015): “uncertainty in the growth of
productivity (or output per capita) is known to be a critical parameter in determining all
elements of climate change”, all this calls for complementarity between climate policy and
poverty reduction (Schelling 1992).
8 Discussion and Conclusion
We test the recently advanced hypothesis that climate change harms TFP growth by looking
at the past relationship between TFP growth rates and temperature shocks. We find a neg-
ative relationship only in poor countries. The relationship is robust to alternative samples,
alternative data, alternative specifications, and to spatial autocorrelation. There is some evi-
dence that temperature shocks may have a negative effect in hot countries too. The estimated
temperature effect on TFP growth probably explains the effect on economic growth found
in previous papers, and is probably explained by temperature effects on labour productivity.
While statistically significant, our upper bound estimate suggest that climate change would
reduce TFP growth by less than 0.1%.
The findings of this paper confirm the results of Dell et al. (2012), who also found a statis-
tically significant but modestly sized relationship between temperature levels and economic
growth only in poor countries, and that showed using lags and long differences a persistence
of weather impacts in the medium run which is likely to mean the presence of growth effects
other, or rather, than level output effects. Our results contradict the conclusions of Burke
et al. (2015), who found large aggregate impacts of temperature on productivity.
Using the first differences of TFP and temperature levels, this work not only alleviates the
issue of non-stationarity in panel analysis which may tend to produce spurious results, but
also directly addresses the issue of potential long-run growth effects, since its main dependent
variable is notably one of the main drivers of long-run economic growth (Solow 1956). In
this different perspective, an impact on annual TFP growth is already, per se a long-term
impact. There is no need to use first differences, since in this scenario temperature shocks
affects economic activity not through Eq. (1), but directly through Eq. (4).
Conversely, Dell et al. (2012) could not explicitly show the presence of growth effects.
Interestingly, we also detect empirical evidence for persistence of impacts in poor coun-
tries, where the negative impacts of temperature shocks on TFP growth are not absorbed in
the short run and cumulate over time.
However, a number of limits and caveats for this work also need to be made clear. First:
sample size and data quality. Both our samples only include less than 70 countries (60
and 68, respectively). Although together they account for a large share of world GDP and
population, sample size is indeed reduced. As for data quality, TFP data represent the so-
called Solow residual, and in fact this is the way they are calculated in PWT 8.1 (Feenstra
et al. 2013, 2015; Inklaar and Timmer 2013). Therefore, the estimates are potentially affected
by measurement error and a whole host of errors in the specification and the estimation of
the production function used to derive TFP. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge there
is no availability of other TFP datasets at the country level covering such a long timespan.
Weather data as well notably suffer from measurement error and different data quality in
different countries. However, the issue of measurement error is at least partially alleviated
here since the results appear to be robust to sample choices, to different specifications of key
explanatory variables, and to different weather data with different aggregation methods.
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Second, as already mentioned in the introduction, external validity with respect to future
climate change. Again, weather variations are not climate variations: the first are random
shorter-run temporal variations, the second are averages over several decades (Dell et al.
2014). In other words climate, as emphasized by Auffhammer et al. (2013), is a long average
of weather at a given location. It is thus key to always keep inmind that a 1 °C shock in a given
year and place is not equivalent to a permanent 1 °C global increase, and that projections
like the simple extrapolation with regard to global warming we performed above typically
suffer from this drawback. In other words, we only estimated the short-run semi-elasticity,
whereas we need to know the long-run semi-elasticity.
Third, future climate change, especially if pronounced as it is projected in some extreme
emission scenarios (IPCC 2013) may well entail consequences and effects which lie outside
historical experience. Substantial sea level rise, a thermohaline circulation slowdown, the
release of methane from melting permafrost are all potential intensifying effects which are
indeed not captured by this analysis, based on a period in which there was only limited
climatic variability and limited warming.
Such an intensification of impacts may well change the picture we depicted, both quanti-
tively and qualitatively.
Fourth, every forecast or projection based on this study implies the assumption that past
historical relationship will continue to hold in the future. As argued in Dell et al. (2014) and
Tol (2018), this could indeed not be the case, either due to intensification of negative impacts
or to adaptation through development in the long run.
Fifth, total factor productivity is an aggregate measure, and changes in total factor pro-
ductivity are due to a variety of changes in underlying economic phenomena. With our data
it is impossible to open this black box, but future research should attempt this using micro-
data and natural experiments. Particularly, our analysis should be repeated with TFP data by
country, year, and industry—data which are, to the best of our knowledge, not yet available.
Sixth, estimates of TFP may be biased by adaptation to climate change. If a country
diverts investment from productive capital to defensive capital (e.g., seawalls), then this
would register as a drop in total factor productivity. Defensive investment may be more
likely after hot weather. Since temperature is autocorrelated, this would bias our estimates.
There are no international data on defensive investment, let alone defensive investment to
protect against weather shocks and climate change. We therefore cannot estimate the size of
this bias. We suspect, however, that this bias is small as few countries have invested heavily
in adaptive capacity.
The central finding of this work is that TFP growth rates of poor countries are affected
by temperature shocks in recent past. Once again, poverty means vulnerability. However,
this causal relationship between temperature, poverty and productivity growth is subjected
to caveats and should be interpreted with caution. What this analysis suggests is the fact that
weather shocks affect economic growth through the TFP channel only when coupled with
poverty, not that climate change will harm future economic growth by affecting technological
progress, as hypothesized in literature. Hence, given the preeminent importance of TFP
growth for long-run development, and under the assumption that weather impacts have at
least some external validity with regard to climate change, the main conclusions that stem
from this paper are an increase of concerns over the inequality of future impacts, a policy
guideline which considers poverty reduction as a crucial and paramount element of climate
policy and, at the research level, a call for further studies on the potential dynamic effects of
future climate change.
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